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7.1  Flexibility and the Lag in Monetary Policy 
The  position  now  held  by  monetary  policy  as the  main  tool  of 
short-run stabilization has yet to be reconciled with the accumulating 
evidence of a substantial lag in its effects on economic activity.  A 
lag complicates the execution of policy, since it means that actions 
take effect well after they are initiated. Hence a policy of stabilizing 
short-run fluctuations  in the economy implies the ability to forecast 
the course of economic activity and the subsequent effects of policy 
actions . 
Twenty-five years ago Milton Friedman pointed to the problems of 
a flexible short-run stabilization policy.’ Adapting the argument spe- 
cifically to flexible monetary policy, he later wrote: “We seldom in fact 
know which way the economic wind is blowing until several months 
after the event, yet to be effective, we need to know which way the 
wind is going to be blowing when the measures we take now will be 
effective, itself a variable date that may be a half year or year or two 
years from now.”* He concluded that countercyclical monetary policy 
in the United States was more often a destabilizing rather than a sta- 
bilizing influence and proposed  as a policy  rule a constant rate of 
increase in the money stock. 
In recent years research on monetary policy has begun to explore 
the problems faced by  stabilization programs with  short-run objec- 
tives.3 In this paper we bring together the results of studies that provide 
evidence of the lag in monetary effects. The lag patterns indicate that 
a change in the money stock in the current quarter induces a change 
in GNP not only in that quarter but also in many succeeding quarters. 
Thus, according to these patterns, the value of GNP in any quarter is 
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a sum of the effects produced by money stock changes in a string of 
preceding quarters. 
Generally speaking, given the limitations of present forecasting ca- 
pabilities, the longer the lag the more impracticable a policy of short- 
run stabilization becomes. The flexibility allowed by the short inside 
lag of monetary policy-the  lag between the provision of reserves to 
the banks by the Federal Reserve System and the change in the money 
stock-can  be  negated  by  a long outside lag-the  lag between  the 
change  in  the money  stock and its effects.  The studies we  review 
suggest that  the problem posed by  imperfect forecasting techniques 
combined with long lags persists and, as Friedman pointed out, seri- 
ously limits the feasibility of flexible monetary policy. 
We  begin by distinguishing the short-run monetary policy actions at 
issue here from the day-to-day and week-to-week flexibility also ad- 
vocated by the proponents of flexibility. Possible conflicts are noted 
between the objective  of  stabilizing economic activity by  short-run 
flexible monetary policy and the objective of moderating transient money 
market disturbances by a policy of stabilizing interest rates (section 
7.2). We  then compare some estimates of lags after World War I1 with 
those for the  1920s for evidence of possible changes in the lag.  We 
were unable to establish that such changes had occurred.  Our main 
focus is on four versions of distributed lag patterns in regression models 
relating GNP to the behavior of the money stock in past quarters. All 
the lags cover many quarters (section 7.3). We  predict GNP quarterly 
from MI  data for 1921 to 1970, based on each lag pattern, and select 
peaks and troughs in the estimated GNP series. The timing of these 
turns compared with actual peaks and troughs in GNP or NBER ref- 
erence dates suggests that the lag pattern itself is not fixed (section 
7.4). For each of these lag patterns, we calculate the hypothetical re- 
quired course of monetary growth in order to achieve a specified in- 
crease in GNP above its previous level. If the attempt were made to 
attain the target within a few quarters, it would require a complex path 
of monetary growth with the attendant possibility that the attempted 
policy itself, if not right on target, would become a source of instability. 
Neither the pattern estimated by the most sophisticated methods nor 
by simpler methods is favorable to a flexible monetary policy (section 
7.5). The effects on GNP of seasonal or other periodic movements in 
monetary growth are briefly discussed in section 7.6. Section 7.7 sum- 
marizes our findings. 
7.2  Kinds of  Flexibility 
Proponents of a flexible monetary policy often have several objec- 
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lag in  monetary effects on economic activity means that day-to-day 
variations in monetary growth may be smoothed over by the lag and 
have no long-run importance for economic activity and prices.  Con- 
sequently, such day-to-day variations can be made in pursuit of a tran- 
sient objective without interfering with economic stabilization goals. 
In appraising the flexibility of monetary policy, therefore, we should 
distinguish three different objectives of monetary policy according to 
the time span over which they apply. Spans from a day up to two or 
three weeks may be termed transient; the short run covers spans from 
a month to three or four quarters, and the long run from one to several 
years or longer. 
On a day-to-day basis, open-market operations may be used to offset 
transient variations in the expansion multiplier of the banking system. 
Such variations originate within the monetary system and affect the 
growth rate of the money stock. A major part of the day-to-day activity 
of Federal Reserve open-market operations is devoted to offsetting such 
variations and is believed to be desirable to control the stock of money 
in the short run. It can be debated whether day-to-day variations in 
monetary growth are of consequence, and therefore whether it is worth- 
while trying to moderate them, but in any event such policy actions to 
offset transient movements in financial markets, typically undertaken 
by Federal Reserve, have little import for economic stabilization. 
For the long run, policy seeks a high level of employment and rea- 
sonable price stability. There may be disagreement at any particular 
time on the combination of employment and price change it is desirable 
to try to achieve. But, given the long-run goal, it will be consistent 
with a particular average rate of monetary growth. So far as the long- 
run goal is concerned, the monetary growth rate would not have to be 
adjusted except perhaps infrequently for changes in the growth trend 
of monetary velocity. The transient and long-run objectives of monetary 
policy entail no problem with lags. It is the short-run objectives which 
face a problem. 
Proponents of  a flexible monetary policy argue that all three time 
horizons should be the concern of monetary policy, but they put par- 
ticular emphasis on the need for short-run flexibility. The purpose is 
to moderate cyclical fluctuations in  economic activity  and financial 
disturbances which last longer than a few weeks. These two objectives 
are partly related, since moderating fluctuations in financial markets 
may help to stabilize economic activity. This is true of shifts in pref- 
erences by the public as between money balances and other financial 
assets. These shifts lead to changes in interest rates that can affect 
aggregate demand, and an accommodating monetary policy would in 
this case keep both interest rates and aggregate demand on a stable 
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shifts in the demand for capital goods, and if interest rates are stabilized 
under these circumstances, an accommodating monetary policy will 
destabilize aggregate activity by feeding an inflation when interest rates 
rise or deepening a depression when they fall4  Unfortunately, there is 
often no clear indication of the reason for changes in interest rates at 
the moment they occur. To avoid the possibility of interfering with the 
more important long-run objective of  stabilizing aggregate demand, 
therefore, a policy of moderating changes in interest rates has to reverse 
itself within a short time period so as not to veer away from the ap- 
propriate long-run rate of monetary growth. 
Discussions of monetary policy have long noted this conflict between 
the stabilization of interest rates and of  aggregate demand.  But the 
conflict is often obscured by the altogether different question of using 
interest rates and general financial conditions as input data for fore- 
casting economic activity and as indicators of  whether the long-run 
goals are being achieved. A long-run goal for employment and prices 
implies some appropriate behavior  of monetary growth and interest 
rates as well  as other economic variables,  and any group of  these 
variables can in principle serve as indicators. In this way interest rates 
apd financial conditions may certainly be relevant to policy-making, 
but  their function as indicators does not  mean  that they  should be 
stabilized as targets-that  is, as the objective of policy. The proper role 
of financial conditions in forecasting economic activity and as indicators 
of policy is a technical question which we put aside here. 
The frequent changes that occur in financial markets nevertheless 
invite  short-run variations  in  policy  both  to moderate the financial 
disturbances and to counteract the change in economic activity which 
those disturbances appear to indicate is underway (assuming the two 
objectives are consistent). Here the flexibility of policy can come into 
sharp conflict with the lag in its effect. Suppose that money has been 
growing at a rate which was thought appropriate to achieve the desired 
growth in aggregate demand for several years ahead. Then some new 
information (financial or other) becomes available indicating that ag- 
gregate demand will be lower-though  not permanently so-than  the 
long-run goal in  the next  several quarters.  Should monetary policy 
attempt to correct the shortfall? The answer depends in part upon how 
quickly policy actions can be expected to affect aggregate demand. A 
change in money balances sets in motion a chain of adjustments which 
ultimately  produces  a change in aggregate expenditures, but the ad- 
justments are spread over a considerable period of time. Hardly anyone 
expects policy to have its major effect on aggregate expenditures within 
a couple of months.  But suppose it has some partial effect within a 
few quarters. The question can then be reformulated to bring out the 
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desired effect in a few quarters with the intention of reversing it later 
to avoid interfering with the long-run goal? 
Whether such short-run flexibility in monetary policy accomplishes 
its purpose is a lively issue, because the Federal Reserve makes large 
and frequent changes in the rate at which it supplies reserves to the 
banking system, apparently for all the reasons cited above. Present 
monetary policy works to offset transient fluctuations in the utilization 
of reserves by banks and to moderate other sources of disturbance to 
financial markets as they occur; this is the first kind of flexibility cited 
above. Monetary policy also pursues the second kind of flexibility to 
achieve stability over the short run: it is clear from the reports of the 
Open Market Committee that short-run operations are based on fore- 
casts of economic activity for several quarters ahead with a view to 
altering the outcome in line with employment and price-level objec- 
tives, not to mention stability of financial markets. 
To what extent, then, can short-run variations in policy be successful 
in stabilizing economic activity and prices and, despite the lag in its 
effect, not be a source of instability? If the net effect of a flexible policy 
is to increase instability in the economy at large, it cannot be justified. 
We  shall first examine the accumulated evidence on the lag, and then 
the implications for policy. 
7.3  Evidence on the Monetary Lag 
7.3.1  Step Dates 
The first statistical evidence on the lag was presented  some years 
ago by Clark Warburton and then by Friedman and Anna J. Sch~artz.~ 
Warburton’s measure of  the lag, based on turning points in the devia- 
tions of monetary growth from its trend, is subject to considerable error 
because of difficulties in determining the trend. Friedman and Schwartz 
measured the lag from steps in the rate of change of money to corre- 
sponding business cycle turns.6 The step method treats the monetary 
lag as discrete; that is, after a delay, the impact of the change in mon- 
etary growth on activity is assumed to be concentrated at one point in 
time. 
The lags based on these steps since 1921 are shown in table 7.1 for 
cyclical turns in  general business  activity, as given by the National 
Bureau chronology, and in GNP. The starting date is the earliest for 
which quarterly GNP is available. General business activity is the most 
relevant  single  benchmark  for monetary  effects.  While GNP gives 
somewhat  different results,  it  is also relevant  because  most  of  the 
statistical lag patterns to be examined were estimated for GNP.7 Table 7.1  Lead (-) or Lag (+)  of  Steps in Monetary Growth Rate 
Compared with Corresponding Cydid  ’hns  in Business Activity 
and GNP,  1921-1970 (Quarters) 
Date and Direction of  Reference 
Step Turn in Monetary  Cyclesb  GNPC 
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Sources: Monetary step turns, Friedman and Schwartz (unpublished manuscript), giving 
dates for MI  through 1969 IV,  as in Edward Gramlich, “The Usefulness of Monetary 
and Fiscal Policy as Discretionary Stabilization Tools,” Journal  of Money, Credit, and 
Banking 3 (May 1971): 506-32.  Reference dates, Geoffrey H. Moore, ed., Business Cycle 
Indicators  (Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University Press for NBER, 1961),  1:671,  and 
Solomon Fabricant,  “Recent  Economic Changes and the  Agenda  of  Business-Cycle 
Research,”  National Bureau Report 8,  Supplement (May 1971):26,  table 2. GNP  before 
1929, Harold Barger and Lawrence Klein (unpublished worksheets; thereafter, Depart- 
ment of Commerce). 
“Narrow money supply, MI. 
bSkipped reference turns are 1945 IV (trough) and 1948 IV (peak). 
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The lags in column  1  of table 7.1 for business activity have an in- 
terquartile range of  1V2 to 4 quarters and an overall median of 2. 
7.3.2  The Step Dates before and after World War I1 
It is interesting that the medians shown for the two subperiods sug- 
gest that the lags after World War I1 are somewhat shorter than before. 
The growth of various money substitutes since World War I1 (partic- 
ularly savings and loan deposits, time certificates of deposit, Treasury 
bills, and commercial paper) is often taken to imply just the opposite. 
JohnG. Gurley and Edward Shaw, writing of  developments  in the 
1950s, touched off a voluminous literature on the dangers of money 
substitutes to the efficacy of  monetary policy.* Their argument was 
that the growth of substitutes makes the demand for money balances 
more responsive to changes in interest rates, with the result that changes 
in the money stock take longer to affect aggregate expenditures. Sup- 
posedly a very  elastic demand for money balances  readily  absorbs 
changes in the money  stock through movements along the demand 
curve, thus delaying the effect on aggregate expenditures.  Whatever 
the merits of the argument, the interest elasticity does not appear to 
have increased. We  have estimated the short-run interest elasticity of 
money demand separately for the 1920s and 1953-65,  using the same 
functional form to facilitate comparison,  and find no evidence of  an 
increase.  It  seems to be roughly  the  same or possibly  lower  now. 
Although the growth of money substitutes contributed to the long-run 
decline in money demand which  is reflected  in the postwar rise  in 
monetary velocity, apparently it did not increase the interest elasticity 
of the remaining  balance^.^ 
7.3.3  Distributed Lags 
The reduction in the average length of the lag after World War 11, 
however, has not been great enough to counter a basic difficulty con- 
fronting a flexible monetary policy. The difficulty pertains to our im- 
perfect knowledge of the lag in monetary effects on economic activity. 
The lag varies considerably over time, owing in part to errors in the 
data as well as the existence of  other cyclical developments that rein- 
force or offset the monetary effects. The variation is also a reflection 
of the diverse channels through which monetary effects are produced, 
which means that the resulting changes in aggregate expenditures occur 
after delays of different durations. Hence, depending on the particular 
channels of  response characterizing a cyclical  episode, the average 
duration of the lag is likely to vary from one period to the next. 
Even without changes frbm period to period, the various channels 
through which monetary effects are produced have different lag times. 
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distributed over time. Numerous studies have estimated the average 
time distribution  of  the lag by  relating GNP to the behavior  of the 
money stock in past quarters, taking account in some cases of other 
influences on GNP. The regression coefficients of past monetary changes 
can be interpreted  as forming the weights of  a distributed lag. The 
regression which estimates these weights has the advantage of utilizing 
every observation of the time series within the period examined, instead 
of ignoring all observations except those around the step turns. But it 
also has the disadvantage, which is not true of the step dates, of as- 
suming a fixed lag distribution over the period covered and of treating 
every observation as equally important in estimating monetary effects.I0 
Estimates of a distributed lag were presented by Fnedman and David I. 
Meiselman in their 1963 study,I1 and their general approach was fol- 
lowed in subsequent work by the research staff of the Federal Reserve 
Bank  of  St. Louis.12 The widely  discussed St. Louis  equation is a 
relation between changes in GNP and lagged changes in the money 
stock, holding constant a variable representing fiscal policy (namely, 
changes in high-employment federal expenditures). Various versions 
of  the lag pattern  have been  estimated, depending  upon  the period 
covered and the number of terms in the lag. 
All versions of the St. Louis lag pattern have the same general form.I3 
The weights are the largest for the current and most recent past quar- 
ters, gradually declining thereafter, and becoming negative after the 
fourth quarter if lag terms are included for such earlier quarters. Over- 
shooting at the beginning is indicated when initial terms produce more 
than the final total effect. Negative weights at the end provide a partial 
offset. Such a lag pattern is theoretically appealing. It means that mon- 
etary changes induce a movement in the ratio of money to GNP initially 
away from its starting level because of the delayed effect on GNP, but 
that the ratio eventually moves back toward a long-run equilibrium 
level. At some point, therefore, the rate of change in GNP will have 
to exceed the rate of change in the money stock for a while in order 
that the ratio of money to GNP  can move back toward its starting level. 
Hence we observe overshooting in which the rate of  change of GNP 
goes past its new equilibrium for a while.I4 
We  reestimated various versions of the St. Louis equation and se- 
lected one as representative. l5 Its lag pattern is presented in column 2 
of table 7.2 as St. Louis A along with others to be discussed shortly. 
The shape of the lag pattern remains largely the same for a smaller or 
larger  number of  lag terms included  in  the regression equation.  As 
usually presented, the St. Louis equation expresses the variables in 
dollar amounts, but here we used percentage changes. The percentage 
form makes the result  more  applicable to a variety of  time periods 
among which the dollar levels of the variables differ considerably. 191  How Feasible Is a Flexibility Monetary Policy? 
able  7.2  Estimates of the Distributed Lag of Monetary Effects 
St. Louis  FRB-MIT-Penn 
Lag Period  Steps  A  B  Silber  A  B 
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Note: No entry is shown in col.  1 since the step lag is not distributed. Cols. 2-4  give 
regression coefficients of a regression of GNP on the monetary variable. Cols. 5-6  give 
coefficients based on a simulation. Coefficients have been adjusted to sum to unity (see 
n. 25 below). Details of estimation of cols. 2-6  are as follows: (Col. 2) Percentage change 
in GNP regressed on percentage change in MI,  1954 I to 1971 11.  The fitting used an 
Almon polynomial lag, 4th degree, with zero end-point constraint at the tailend. (Col. 3) 
Same as col. 2, except that the monetary variable for the concurrent quarter was omitted. 
(Col. 4) Change in GNP regressed on change in monetary base as compiled and published 
by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1953 I to 1%9  I. See William L. Silber, “The St. 
Louis Equation: ‘Democratic’ and ‘Republican’ Versions and Other Experiments,” Re- 
view ofEconomics and Srarisrics 53 (Nov. 1971): 372-75.  (Cols. 5 and 6) Simulation of 
model (see note 24  below). Franc0 Modigliani, “Monetary  Policy and Consumption: 
Linkages via Interest Rate and Wealth Effects in the FMP Model,” in Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, Consumer Spending and Monetary Policy: The Linkages (Boston, 19711, 
pp. 9-84:  figures kindly supplied by the author. Col. 5 is a simulation of a decrease in 
demand deposits, and col. 6, a simulation of an increase. 
aFor col. 1, mean of entries in table 7.1, col. 1. For cols. 2-6,  weighted averages, each 
a sum of products of the lag period (through period 3 only for cols. 2-4,  and full period 
for cols. 5-6)  times the coefficients, divided by the sum of the coefficients included. 
The other lag patterns represent various attempts, with only partial 
success, to overcome a problem of  feedback for which the St. Louis 
equation has been criticized. This problem is the bias produced by 
economic influences on the money supply. An  increase in GNP, for 
example, may induce banks to expand loans by reducing excess reserve 
ratios or increasing borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks. There 
are limits to how far this bank-generated expansion can go without an 
increase in nonborrowed reserves, but it may produce some concurrent 192  PhiUip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz 
correlation between changes in GNP and in the money supply which 
is not due to monetary effects on GNP. The lag weight at time zero 
may be spuriously enlarged by this feedback and make the average lag 
in monetary effects appear shorter than it is. 
A drastic method for avoiding concurrent feedback is arbitrarily to 
assume that the concurrent coefficient is zero and to impose that con- 
straint on the estimated pattern. The lag pattern shown in column 3 of 
table 7.2 as St. Louis B was derived by this method. It has a slightly 
longer average lag, as expected, but two obvious drawbacks. The method 
forces any concurrent monetary effects to be zero as  well, which makes 
the average lag appear longer than it probably is. At the same time the 
method  does not avoid the effect  of  feedback in  the remaining lag 
terms.  l6 
One method of dealing with feedback is to use the monetary base 
(that is, bank reserves plus currency held by the public) in place of the 
money supply. The effects of GNP on the expansion multiplier of  the 
banking system are thereby omitted. As an alternative to the equation 
using the money supply, a version of the St. Louis equation using the 
monetary base was also presented. l7 The latter approach  was then 
adopted by staff members of the Board of Governors and of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.”?  Column 4 of  table 7.2  gives a later version 
by William L. Silber which is preferable for our purposes because he 
included more terms at the far end of the lag distribution.19 We  have 
assumed that his estimates can be treated as pertaining to changes in 
the money stock. 
The Silber equation has the disadvantage that it incorporates the lag 
time from the monetary base to the money stock as well as from money 
to GNP. Yet the average length of his lag pattern does not exceed most 
of the others, perhaps because the inside lag of the banking system is 
short. If we were to go further and exclude member-bank borrowing 
as well from the monetary variable, on the grounds that such borrowing 
is endogenous and not offset by Federal Reserve open-market opera- 
tions, the appropriate  monetary  variable  is nonborrowed  reserved. 
Richard G. Davis has  shown that  the inside  lag (from a  change in 
nonborrowed reserves to a change in demand deposits) then appears 
to  be longer, and Michael J. Hamburger, that the total inside and outside 
lag is longer.*O We  have not included such lag distributions in order to 
maintain the comparability of the different lag patterns analyzed here. 
The longer lag implied by models based on nonborrowed reserves would 
increase the difficulty of conducting a stabilizing monetary policy. 
Although Silber’s use of  the monetary base avoids feedback from 
GNP to bank reserve ratios and currency holdings, it incorporates any 
feedback from GNP to the monetary base due to a systematic Federal 
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other equations as well as those using nonborrowed  reserves). For 
example, if the Federal Reserve moderated movements in interest rates 
which accompany fluctuations in GNP, the monetary base would tend 
to display  a positive covariation  with  GNP.  A  special econometric 
technique devised by Christopher A. Sims shows, however, that feed- 
back on the money stock is not strong enough to account for the lag 
relationship between money and GNP, and indeed does not appear to 
be very important if we disregard the concurrent quarter.21  Sim’s tech- 
nique does not deal with feedback in that quarter and so does not rule 
out an important immediate feedback from GNP to money.  If  it is 
important, however, it has the effect of raising the estimated weight of 
the concurrent term in the lag distribution and of making the average 
lag appear shorter than it is. Hence the St. Louis and Silber patterns 
may understate the lag and therefore the difficulties of flexible monetary 
policy. (The St. Louis B pattern in table 7.2 does not appear to be an 
adequate solution to this feedback problem, possibly because of serial 
Correlation in the variables.) 
Another  estimation problem  recently  discussed  by  Levis  Kochin 
arises from the policy control of monetary growth to stabilize the econ- 
omy.22  Insofar as monetary policy succeeds in offsetting the effects on 
economic activity of various nonmonetary disturbances, part of the 
fluctuation  in  monetary  growth  will  not  correspond with  observed 
movements in GNP. In the extreme case, if monetary policy succeeded 
in removing all fluctuation from GNP, the correlation between GNP 
and money would be zero. If the stabilization policy is partially but 
not completely successful, the correlation will be negative, and if  the 
stabilization policy  overcorrects for nonmonetary  disturbances,  the 
correlation will be positive. Since we observe a positive correlation, 
monetary policy in practice overcorrects; that is, less fluctuation in 
monetary growth would reduce the fluctuation in GNP growth.  But 
insofar as monetary policy is successful in offsetting the effect on GNP 
of some nonmonetary disturbances, the observed relationship between 
GNP and money does not portray the full effects of money. Moreover, 
in that case, it is not at all clear how the estimates of the lag distribution 
are affected. 
In theory the solution to this estimation problem is to take account 
of all the effects on GNP of nonmonetary variables which monetary 
policy partially offsets. The estimation procedure can then allow for 
the interaction between monetary growth and other variables. 
The intention  of  the large  econometric  models  is indeed  to take 
account of all influences on GNP. Columns 5 and 6 of table 7.2 present 
the lag pattern of monetary effects implied by the FRB-MIT-Penn econ- 
ometric  This is a large-scale model which takes into account 
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tem and nonmonetary influences on GNP.  Despite simplifications to 
make the model manageable, it has the most elaborate financial sector 
of any econometric model so far constructed and represents the “state 
of the art” of model building as it exists today. Yet  we are not alone 
in  doubting seriously whether even this elaborate model deals ade- 
quately with feedback and with the more important problem just dis- 
cussed of  isolating the effects of  stabilization policies. So far it  has 
proved difficult to capture in an econometric model all the disturbances 
affecting GNP which monetary policy may try, in part successfully, to 
offset. We  regard the lag estimates produced by the FRB-MIT-Penn 
model-the  best of  the attempts to allow for interactions-as repre- 
sentative of large econometric models. 
The lag pattern of this model was derived by ~imulation.~~  The es- 
timates represent the effect of  a hypothetical $1  billion change in de- 
mand deposits on the level of GNP in  1967  I. A simulation for a de- 
crease in demand deposits is shown as A in table 7.2, and one for an 
increase as B. Because monetary policy will produce changes in GNP 
before the full effects on the level occur, we expect the FRB-MIT-Penn 
lag pattern to be longer than the others. The longer average lag of the 
pattern may also be due to the fixed channels of monetary effects it 
prescribes. Changes in monetary policy in the model have the effect 
of changing particular interest rates and thereby various components 
of investment and consumption. Insofar as the actual channels are more 
diverse and varying than the model provides for, the effects tend to be 
understated and very likely tend to be faster in coming than it predicts. 
The lag patterns in table 7.2 have been adjusted to sum to unity.25 
Thus each weight gives the percentage of the total effect which occurs 
in each quarter. Although none of the estimation procedures imposed 
such a condition, we  made the adjustment so that they would all give 
the same long-run relation between GNP and the money stock. (The 
adjustment also converts the FRB-MIT-Penn patterns, which were es- 
timated from variables in dollar terms, into a form applicable to vari- 
ables in percentage terms .) The condition is theoretically appealing. 
For the levels of  the variables, a sum equal to unity means that the 
ratio of money to GNP eventually returns to its initial level. For rates 
of change of the variables, it means that the growth rates of GNP and 
the money stock eventually become 
The patterns shown in table 7.2 represent the best of recent research 
on monetary lags.27  Each of the methods of estimation presents certain 
problems, as noted, and none can be clearly preferred. Hence the exact 
form of  the pattern remains in doubt. All agree, however, in showing 
a distributed lag covering many quarters. On that the evidence is clear. 
If  monetary policy is to take account of  lags, it will have to reckon 
with the results of studies such as these. 195  How  Feasible Is a Flexibility Monetary Policy? 
7.4  liming Points Implied by the Lag Patterns 
Whether the lag in monetary effects implied by these patterns is biased 
toward the long or the short side can be tested by the turning points in 
business activity derived from them. This test also indicates how con- 
sistently such fixed lag patterns fit the data over a long period, and par- 
ticularly whether the variability of the leads in step turns can be ex- 
plained by the configuration of monetary growth surrounding the steps. 
We  calculated the predicted levels of GNP from  1921 to 1971 esti- 
mated by  each lag pattern.  As noted earlier, we used the predicted 
level before  1960 and the level divided by the implicit price deflator 
for GNP thereafter, because of  the difficulty of selecting turns in the 
undeflated level during the second half of the 1960s. For the FRB-MIT- 
Penn pattern pertaining to levels,  the logarithm of demand deposits 
was run through the lag pattern to derive an index of the level of GNP 
(in logarithms). Of course, this procedure gives only an approximation 
to a full simulation of the model. For the other patterns pertaining to 
rates of change, the quarterly rate of change of MI  was run through 
the lag pattern to generate an estimated rate of change of GNP (with 
the constant term omitted). These rates of change of GNP were then 
used to derive an index of the level of GNP. Since the lag patterns are 
adjusted to sum to unity, the average rate of growth of this GNP index 
is the same as that of the money stock. The trend of the index and the 
trend of  actual GNP differ by the trend in  the ratio of  GNP to the 
money stock. But these trend differences have little effect on the dates 
of turning points. 
We  selected peaks and troughs in the estimated GNP indexes. The 
turns not corresponding to turns in actual GNP were disregarded. The 
selected turns were compared with the actual peaks and troughs in 
National Bureau reference cycles (which sometimes differ from the 
turns  in GNP).** The timing differences are presented  in  table 7.3, 
together with the average of these differences compared with the av- 
erage deviation for step cycle turns. 
The FRB-MIT-Penn model has the  shortest leads or longest  lags 
(because of its long pattern). It fails to register many of the turns. The 
turning points of the other lag patterns, which are shorter than it is, 
are generally close to the turns in business activity. The differences in 
timing among the three lag patterns excluding FRB-MIT-Penn do not 
appear significant. (As we shall see below, however, the differences 
are important  for policy purposes.)  On this evidence,  it is hard  to 
choose among these three. The variability in their timing is about the 
same. The Silber pattern has the smallest average deviation because 
of its bullseye at the 1957 111  peak, which the St. Louis patterns miss 
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Table 7.3  Lead (-) or Lag (+) and Average Deviation of  Estimated %ms 
Compared with Actual %ms  in  Business Activity, 1921-70 
(Quarters) 
Peaks and Troughs  St. Louis  FRB- 
in  MIT- 
Business Activitya  Steps  A  B  Silber  Penn 
1921 111  trough  +3.6  +2  +2  +2  b 
1923 I1  peak  +0.6  +1  +1  0  b 
1924 111  trough  +0.6  -1  -1  -1  -2 
1926 111  peak  -  1.4  -2  -2  -2 
1927 IV  trough  -  1.4  -1  -2  -2  b 
1929 111  peak  -  3.4  +1  +2  +2  +1 
1933 I  trough  -  0.4  +1  -1  -1  +7 
1937 I1  peak  -  1.4  -1  0  0  +2 
1938 I1  trough  +2.6  +1  +1  +1  b 
1948 IV  peak  -4  -3  -3  b 
1949 IV  trough  + 1.6  0  0  -1  b 
1953 I1  peak  +  0.6  0  +1  -1  b 
1954 111  trough  +  0.6  -1  0  -1  b 
1957 111  peak  -  5.4  -6  -7  0  b 
1958 I1  trough  +0.6  -1  0  0  b 
1960 I1  peak  -  1.4  -3  -2  -3 
1961 I  trough  -0.4  -1  -1  -1  b 
1966IV  peak  -0.4  -1  0  -1  -1 
1967 I  trough  + 1.6  0  +1  +1  0 
1969IV  peak  +  0.6  -1  0  -1  -2 






deviationc  1.5  1.5  1.3  1.2  2.2 
Note: Entries for step turns are the deviations from the average lead of 2.6 quarters (see 
table 7.2). GNP, estimated from lag patterns, was deflated for 1966-70  before selecting 
turns. Without deflation, most of the estimates skip the turns. For FRB-MIT-Penn es- 
timated GNP, peaks were selected from estimates based on table 7.2,  col. 5, troughs 
from estimates based on table 7.2, col. 6. 
"Peaks and troughs in National Bureau reference cycles (see source note to table 7.1) 
except for 1966-67,  which is not designated a reference cycle and is based on  turns in 
real GNP. The 1945 reference peak and trough are omitted. 
bNo  matching turn. 
=Average  of leads or lags, without regard to sign, excluding 1948 peak and, for FRB- 
MIT-Penn, other skipped turns. 
This last result deserves emphasis. If the variability in step lags were 
due to the assumption of  a discrete rather than distributed lag, a dis- 
tributed lag  should give more consistent estimates of  turning point 
dates. As measured by average deviations, the estimated lag patterns 
perform only a little better than the step dates. The failure of the lag 
distributions to give sharply better predictions is presumably due to 197  How Feasible Is a Flexibility Monetary Policy? 
variability in the true lag pattern over time, so that fixed patterns do 
not give very good estimates. 
7.5  Implications of  the Monetary Lag for Policy 
Effects which are distributed over time create problems for policy. 
Granted, if  the lag pattern were known with certainty, the monetary 
authorities could calculate a path of monetary growth to achieve the 
desired path of GNP. But the calculated path appears to require wide 
swings in monetary growth. Because of uncertainty over the effects, 
large swings pose the danger of adding to instability. 
We can examine the problems inherent in these lag patterns by means 
of a simple but common situation. Suppose that the economy lies below 
the desired growth path of GNP and monetary policy is called upon to 
close the gap in one quarter and thereafter to hold GNP at the previous 
rate of growth. The gap between the desired and actual level of GNP 
is the most common criterion by which policy is judged, for this gap 
influences the rate of unemployment and rate of change of prices; but 
a more complicated assessment of policy would take the effects on 
these and other variables explicitly into account. For present purposes 
we do not distinguish between monetary effects on prices and on real 
output. Table 7.4 gives the required path of monetary growth for closing 
a gap between the desired and actual levels of GNP. It is assumed that 
the previous monetary growth rate, if  unchanged,  would keep GNP 
growing at the desired rate but along a trend now viewed as 2 percent 
too low. The figures shown for monetary growth increase GNP 2 per- 
cent above its previous level in one quarter and thereafter maintain 
the previous rate of growth. 
The results point to two serious difficulties for policy. First, the initial 
increase in the monetary growth rate must be relatively large, because 
the concurrent effect on GNP is small. Thereafter the rate must swing 
up and down to offset the continuing effects of the initial and subsequent 
changes. For example, with the St. Louis pattern, to achieve a 2 percent 
increase in GNP above its previous level in one quarter, the money 
stock must grow in that quarter at a 15.5 percent annual rate (2  x  4/ 
S2). To offset the lagged effect of that 15.5 percent rate of monetary 
growth, the growth rate in  the next quarter would have  to drop to 
-  18.6 at an annual rate. To  offset the cumulated lagged effects of  the 
15.5 percent rate in the initial quarter and the  -18.6  percent in the 
quarter after that, the monetary growth rate in the following quarter 
would then have to rise to 8.4 percent, and so back and forth in sub- 
sequent quarters.29 
The lag patterns are jagged, due no doubt to errors in the estimates. 
The true distribution of monetary effects could theoretically have a 198  Phillip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz 
'hble 7.4  Monetary Growth Policy Which Achieves Target Level of GNP  2 
Percent above Trend in  One Quarter: Deviations from Long-run 
Growth (Percentage per Year) 
St. Louis  FRB-MIT-Penn 
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-  1865.9 
2475.4 
46.2 









-  62.2 
59.5 
-20.4 
-  12.6 
49.6 
63.0 
-  23.8 
-  100.5 
40.3 
31.1 
-  26.8 
-  10.5 
-7.3 
15.9 
-  18.9 
-  40.5 
58.4 
16.2 
-  24.0 
24.1 
Note: Method of computation-For  each quarter a change in monetary growth is cal- 
culated which will maintain GNP  2 percent above trend, given the lag pattern and past 
monetary growth. It  is assumed that monetary growth was at the trend rate before the 
beginning quarter and thereafter is as calculated. Rates would be double for 4 percent 
increase in target, and so on. 
variety of  patterns, but it is more likely represented by  a relatively 
smooth curve. The jagged estimates therefore impose jumps on the 
required monetary growth path here which are not in fact needed to 
stabilize GNP.  But  this  source of  fluctuation is  probably  of  minor 
importance. 
The main difficulty is that the swings become larger and larger-that 
is, they are explosive or close to it for all except the regular St. Louis 
equation (A).30  If not explosive, the fluctuations in the monetary growth 
rate would converge upon the long-run equilibrium rate which, in table 
7.4, is assumed to be zero (the rates are given as deviations from the 
long-run path). There is nothing in  the property of  lag distributions 
which requires them to have this kind of stability for policy purposes. 
Even in the St. Louis case, which is convergent, the changes in mon- 
etary growth have to follow a complicated back-and-forth pattern for 
many quarters. 
A necessary requirement for stability is that the later effects and the 
needed oFsets to them be sufficiently small relative to the initial effects. 
It might  seem, therefore, that  the overshooting produced  by  some 
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be produced by  small increases in monetary growth.  But the over- 
shooting requires complicated offsets later as the initial increase runs 
through the negative part of the lag distribution. 
Given the uncertainties in forecasting future GNP and our limited 
knowledge of  the precise lag patterns,  monetary policy cannot risk 
large swings in monetary growth. Small errors of diagnosis would rein- 
force rather than reduce instability in the economy. It is clear from 
table 7.4 that monetary growth rates appropriate for one pattern would 
produce considerable undesired fluctuation in GNP if one of the other 
patterns were in fact the correct one. Much of the literature on sta- 
bilization policies assumes that the magnitude of errors of execution 
is given independently of the complexity of the policies to be followed. 
But actually the magnitude of error is likely to increase sharply with 
complexity. 
Based on such lag patterns as these, we conclude that stabilization 
goals must be content with longer time horizons than one quarter. How 
long? A first step toward an answer is provided by table 7.5. Here the 
policy goal is to achieve a 2 percent increase in GNP in two quarters 
rather than  one.  The  required  monetary growth in  each quarter is 
determined by the difference between the desired and actual level of 
GNP and the weight of the first two terms of the lag pattern, which 
give the monetary effect on GNP occurring in the first two quarters. 
While this policy rule reduces the fluctuation in  monetary growth 
considerably, much still remains. The least fluctuating path is still given 
by the St. Louis pattern A, but its required monetary growth goes from 
7 to -  3 percent at an annual rate in the first three quarters and follows 
a convergent but still complicated course thereafter. The gain of a less 
fluctuating monetary growth path occurs at the expense of deviations 
from the GNP  target. The target is never reached but only approached, 
since policy is continually offsetting the accumulating effects of pre- 
vious monetary  change^.^'  Deviations from the target are shown in 
table 7.6for the St. LouisA and FRB-MIT-Penn models. The deviations 
are expressed as percentages of the target increase and in this form 
are invariant to the size of the desired target increase. For St. Louis, 
deviations from the target level of GNP of nearly 20 percent continue 
until the fifth quarter, after which the discrepancy remains between 5 
and 11 percent. For FRB-MIT-Penn, the deviations continue to range 
up to 16 percent. 
At first sight a discrepancy which after a few quarters remains below 
11 or even 16 percent seems attractive. But we need only glance back 
at table 7.5 to realize how unattainable even this weak policy rule is. 
It entails extremely complicated and continuing variations in monetary 
growth. A realistic policy must be based on fairly modest and simple 
variations in monetary growth. However,  as we weaken  the stabili- 200  Phillip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz 
Table 7.5  Monetary Growth Policy Which Aims for Target Level of  GNP  2 
Percent above Trend in Two Quarters: Deviations from Long-run 
Growth (Percentage per Year) 
St. Louis  FRB-MIT-Penn 
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-  1.7 
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5.0 
-11.6 





Note: Method of computation-Same  as table 7.4, except that monetary growth in each 
quarter is determined by  dividing the deviation from the target level of  GNP by  the 
fraction of  monetary effects which occurs in two quarters according to the lag distri- 
bution. Thus the entry for St. Louis A in quarter 0 is 2 x 4/1.14 (sum of first two weights 
in table 7.2), or 7 percent per year. This yields an increase in GNP above trend in that 
quarter of  .91 (7  x  .52/4).  The deviation from the target level of a 2 percent increase 
above trend is 1.09. This is reduced to zero in the next quarter, because the 7 percent 
monetary growth of the initial quarter then increases GNP by  1.09 (7  x  .62/4). Hence 
a zero monetary growth rate in period 1 achieves the target level of an increase in GNP 
of  2 percent above trend.  No further change would be required in period 2, but past 
monetary growth will generate an increase in  GNP above trend  of  32  (7  x  .47/4), 
producing a deviation from the target level. A negative monetary growth rate in period 
2 is therefore required: -  2.9 (- .82 x 4/1.14).  And so on. Monetary growth rates would 
be double for 4 percent increase in target, and so on. 
zation target further in order to reduce the fluctuations in monetary 
growth, say by achieving the target in three quarters instead of two, 
the deviations from the target will increase. There is no smooth pattern 
of monetary growth which will closely approximate desired changes in 
GNP within a few quarters. As policy tries to reduce deviations from 
the target, the more complex becomes the monetary growth path. 
The two-quarter rule depicted by tables 7.5  and 7.6 seems to us a 
reasonable way to extend the perfect but unattainable one-quarter pol- 
icy depicted by table 7.4. There is a trade-off here between the size of 
required variations in monetary growth and that of deviations from the 
target level of GNP. Different rules produce different combinations of 
fluctuation in the two variables, and there is no clear optimum. Con- 
tinuing fluctuations in monetary growth can be avoided, of course, by 201  How Feasible Is a Flexibility Monetary Policy? 
Table 7.6  Deviations of  GNP from Given Target Level under a Two-quarter 
Policy Horizon (Percentage of Target Increase) 
St. Louis  FRB-MIT-Penn 
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-  27 
-  20 
+3 
-5 
-  10 









-  15 
Note: The data shown are cumulated changes in GNP in each quarter, based on current 
quarter and past monetary growth rates, expressed as a percentage of target increase in 
table 7.5. Results are the same for any target level which is a constant percentage of the 
trend level. 
simply making a change in one quarter and then maintaining a stable 
rate.  Such a policy, however, does not solve the problem of lags. It 
merely shifts the consequences of the lag from money to GNP. We may 
illustrate with the lag pattern of the regular St. Louis equation (A). An 
initial growth rate of 7 percent achieves a 2 percent increase in GNP 
in the second quarter (table 7.5). No change in monetary growth from 
trend is required in the second quarter, but changes are required in 
subsequent quarters to offset the initial increase. If these subsequent 
changes were not made, it would greatly lessen the complexity of the 
policy. But the result would be to increase the subsequent fluctuations 
in GNP, as the initial increase in money worked through the lag pattern 
and no offsets were provided.  The deviations from the GNP target 
increase are given in table 7.7. They do not fall below 40 percent of 
the target increase until the sixth quarter. Since the lag is eight quarters 
in length, GNP does not fluctuate after that, though  it only attains 
seven-eighths of the target increase. This is the most favorable case 
for a one-shot change in monetary growth among these lag patterns. 
The other patterns produce  even more fluctuation in GNP, because 
they require larger offsets. 
Perhaps someone can offer a more appealing strategy than simply 
extending the two-quarter rule illustrated here to three or more quar- 
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able  7.7  Deviations of GNP  from Given Target Level for a One-quarter 
Increase in Monetary Growth (Percentage of  Target Increase) 
Quarter  St. Louis A 
0  -  55 
1  0 
2  40 
3  60 
4  57 
5  39 
6  16 
7  -3 
8  -  12 
Note: The data shown are changes in GNP in each quarter, based on monetary growth 
rate in quarter 0 only, expressed as a percentage of target increase. Results are the same 
for any target level which is a constant percentage of the trend level. 
in GNP rather than levels.32  While such a rule appears to require less 
volatility in monetary  it does so only at the cost of larger 
discrepancies from the target level. Unless shown otherwise, we con- 
clude that any other rules which may be suggested for these lag patterns 
will be equally unsatisfactory. 
These results do not prove that policy cannot contribute at all to 
short-run stability. Given reliable forecasts of GNP, small uncompli- 
cated changes in monetary growth can be made to bring the economy 
closer to the target. Because of uncertainty, however, the changes will 
have to be modest if they are not frequently to be a source of instability. 
But, if they are modest, the achievements will likewise be modest, so 
that the risks of  error do not obviously outweigh the possible gains. 
7.6  Seasonal or  Other Periodic Movements in Monetary Growth 
If policy objectives with a short-run horizon are not feasible because 
of lags, day-to-day objectives for financial markets might for that reason 
seem feasible, on the grounds that the lag smooths over transient vari- 
ations in monetary growth. For long, flat lag distributions, that is true. 
But for lag distributions with overshooting, it is generally not true. The 
consequences of periodic variations in monetary growth are shown in 
table 7.8 for the two sample patterns used previously. It is assumed 
that an average 4 percent per year rate of monetary growth is concen- 
trated all in the first one, two, or  three quarters of a symmetrical cycle. 
The table shows the effect on GNP. As calculated, the level of GNP 
starts below or even with the old trend, goes above, and then returns 
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Table 7.8  Deviations of GNP  from Trend Level Produced By 100 Percent 
Variations Around a Monetary Growth of 4 Percent per Year 
(Percentage of Trend Level) 
Pattern of Monetary Growth and Lag Pattern 
1Q Variation  24  Variation  34  Variation 
(8, 0, 8, 0, etc.)  (8, 8, 0, 0, etc.)  (8, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, etc.) 
FRB-  FRB-  FRB- 
St. Louis  MIT-  St. Louis  MIT-  St. Louis  MIT- 
Quarter  A  PennA  A  PennA  A  Penn A 
1  +.17  +  .54  -  .24  + .04  -  .97  0 
2  0  0  + .35  + .08  -  1.07  -.16 
3  Repeats  +  .59  + .04  -  .03  + .23 
4  0  0  + .93  +  .22 
5  Repeats  + 1.04  + .38 
6  0  0 
Repeats 
Nore: It is assumed that the pattern of monetary growth has been in effect at least for 
the length of  the lag patterns.  Cumulated change in GNP in each quarter, based on 
alternative monetary growth patterns, is converted to a deviation from a 4 percent trend 
in GNP. 
The lag patterns smooth the effect but not completely, and GNP 
fluctuates cyclically around the new growth path. Some of the fluctua- 
tions are not minor. The fluctuation for St. Louis with the two-quarter 
pattern  is from  -.24  to  +.59,  or an amplitude of  .83 percent.  In a 
trillion dollar economy, that is a fluctuation of  $8.3 billion. For the 
three-quarter pattern, the fluctuation is $20 billion. For FRB-MIT-Penn, 
the fluctuations  are narrower  as a  consequence of its long, flat lag 
pattern.  Such fluctuations could well be eradicated in the data by an 
overly absorbent seasonal adjustment, but they remain real contribu- 
tions to instability nonetheless. 
7.7  Summary and Conclusions 
For monetary policy to be stabilizing on net, either it must operate 
with a short lag in its effects, or if the lag is long, economic forecasting 
must be accurate far ahead so that monetary policy can take the lag in 
effect into account and be guided appropriately.  These prerequisites 
are not an important obstacle to either transient or  long-run objectives. 
Transient effects on financial markets can be produced with little carry- 
over to economic activity if  the lag in effect on activity is long. And 
monetary policies designed for the long run have a long-run effect which 
is independent of lags. But for short-run policies-those  which range 
from a quarter to a year-the  unreliability of economic forecasting and 204  Phillip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz 
the lag in monetary effects become important. The continued use and 
defense of short-run flexibility in monetary policy have yet to be rec- 
onciled with the growing evidence on the lag in its effect. 
The issue has remained  unsettled in large part because the exact 
pattern of the monetary lag has not been determined. Numerous studies 
of the lag give somewhat different results. We  examined four of the 
most sophisticated estimates of  the lag pattern and found that their 
predictive power of turning points in economic activity was only slightly 
better than that of the simple step method. This suggests that the lag 
distribution varies over time and cannot be reliably estimated by a fixed 
pattern. 
Despite these drawbacks, the estimates all agree on a distributed lag 
of monetary effects which spans two years or more, with the strong 
possibility that the initial effects overshoot the long-run effect. In the 
light of this evidence, it no longer seems possible to maintain that the 
lag is short and uncomplicated.  We  pointed out that the step lag ap- 
peared to be shorter since World War I1 than formerly (contrary to 
some theoretical implications of the growth of money substitutes), but 
the decline, if  any, was too slight to lessen materially the difficulties 
of short-run monetary stabilization. 
We  explored these difficulties by calculating the path of monetary 
growth required  to achieve target levels of  GNP. In the first set of 
calculations the target was an increase in the level to be achieved in 
one quarter and maintained thereafter. Such policies are sharply cir- 
cumscribed by a long lag pattern because of its tendency to be explo- 
sive. This causes the offsets to the future effects of policies to become 
unmanageably large. The version of the St. Louis equation used here 
is not explosive, though pursuit of a flexible policy under its lag struc- 
ture is still severely constrained by the practical need to avoid com- 
plicated swings in monetary growth. All the other patterns examined 
are explosive or close to it, especially the pattern implied by the FRB- 
MIT-Penn model, which, despite its limitations, many consider to be 
the  most  sophisticated  representation  of  the  economy  so far  con- 
structed. These other patterns circumscribe much more severely than 
does the St. Louis equation the degree to which stabilizing variations 
in monetary growth are feasible. 
We  presented a second set of calculations for a weaker policy rule 
which aimed to achieve the target level in two quarters. Even under 
the weaker rule, the required path of monetary growth entails swings 
up and down from quarter to quarter, much too complicated, we be- 
lieve, even to be approximated by the present state of the policy art. 
Attempts to do so, in the light of uncertainties over the exact form of 
the lag pattern, are likely to increase instability rather than reduce it. 
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activity, limited policies which push the economy mildly in the desired 
direction are the most that appear feasible. 
Very  short-run  variations in monetary growth will not have large 
disruptive effects, because a long lag pattern tends to smooth out the 
effects of  such variations in monetary growth.  But we showed that 
periodic variations which are offset within one to three quarters do not 
necessarily have insignificant effects on economic activity. If such vari- 
ations are intentionally introduced to offset undesired changes in eco- 
nomic activity, they  must be timed and executed with considerable 
precision, else they will miss the mark and add to instability. Unless 
precisely executed, they are still a net detriment to economic stability. 
It is the basic difficulty of monetary sharpshooting, given the available 
evidence on the lag distribution and our meager knowledge of it, that 
stacks the case against the success of  a flexible short-run monetary 
policy. 
The evidence which has accumulated on monetary lags since Milton 
Friedman first proposed a constant rate of  monetary growth as the 
wisest policy has by and large supported his case. The estimates of 
the lag reviewed here all indicate similar difficulties for policy. At the 
same time, estimates of the lag distribution differ sufficiently to indicate 
that we still lack the precise knowledge which, if  it were available, 
might partially overcome these difficulties. 
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